Last seen September 2, 2026

AI Security Incident

Manifold Security has disclosed eight security flaws across seven command-line AI coding agents in which a repository's own Git configuration names a command that the agent runs on the developer's machine, four of them still unpatched at publication. The command executes as the user, outside the agent's sandbox and without an approval prompt, and exploitation requires the repository to arrive

Technical Severity
Low severity
Lifecycle Status

STABLE

What Happened

Manifold Security has disclosed eight security flaws across seven command-line AI coding agents in which a repository's own Git configuration names a command that the agent runs on the developer's machine, four of them still unpatched at publication. The command executes as the user, outside the agent's sandbox and without an approval prompt, and exploitation requires the repository to arrive

Why This Matters

Current evidence identifies a security issue involving the affected technology, but does not yet support a more specific impact claim.

Recommended Action

No confirmed vendor remediation is available in the current evidence. Confirm whether the affected technology is present in your environment and review the affected configuration.

Exposure

My Interests Exposure

Exposure unknown

Recommended Response
Last Seen

Sep 02, 2026 19:36

Exposure reason: This incident does not currently match a technology in My Interests.

Exploitation status: UNKNOWN

Primary entities:

Amazon AWSAnthropicClaudeAI AgentsCodexConfigs Can Make

Timeline

  • Incident first seen
    Sep 02, 2026 19:36

    BugSkan first recorded this incident.

  • Malicious .git Configs Can Make Claude, Codex, Cursor, and Other AI Agents Run Attacker Code
    Sep 02, 2026 19:36

    thehackernews.com · Research

Sources

Malicious .git Configs Can Make Claude, Codex, Cursor, and Other AI Agents Run Attacker Code

thehackernews.com · Sep 02, 2026 19:36

Manifold Security has disclosed eight security flaws across seven command-line AI coding agents in which a repository's own Git configuration names a command that the agent runs on the developer's machine, four of them still unpatched at publication. The command executes as the user, outside the agent's sandbox and without an approval prompt, and exploitation requires the repository to arrive

Open publisher source

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