Research explained

How hidden instructions in documents can steer a multimodal AI agent

Trend Micro’s Pandora demonstration examines indirect prompt injection through content an agent is asked to process.

Published 29 Oct 2026 · Material update 12 May 2025 — last time the underlying evidence changed · Evidence: high

What happened

Trend Micro’s May 2025 research demonstrates an AI agent processing malicious instructions embedded in apparently ordinary documents or images. Its Pandora proof of concept shows how an agent with tools can be steered toward harmful execution and data exfiltration.

This is a demonstration of a workflow and trust-boundary problem. It should not be presented as a confirmed breach of every product that can read Word documents or images.

For an agent design review, separate the authority of the user’s request from the content being inspected. Limit accessible data and tool permissions, and require approval for consequential actions. Those are defensive design recommendations; their effectiveness must be tested against the particular agent and integrations.

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What we know

Evidence type
Research demonstration

What remains unknown

Open question
A proof of concept does not establish compromise of a particular production agent.

Source references