AI Authorization Bypass Vulnerability
### Impact The `/config/update endpoint` does not enforce admin role authorization. A user who is already authenticated into the platform can then use this endpoint to do the following: - Modify proxy configuration and environment variables - Register custom pass-through endpoint handlers pointing to attacker-controlled Python code, achieving remote code execution - Read arbitrary server files by setting UI_LOGO_PATH and fetching via /get_image - Take over other priveleged accounts by overwriting UI_USERNAME and UI_PASSWORD environment variables ### Patches Fixed in v1.83.0. The endpoint now requires `proxy_admin` role. ### Workarounds Restrict API key distribution. There is no configuration-level workaround.
What Happened
### Impact The `/config/update endpoint` does not enforce admin role authorization. A user who is already authenticated into the platform can then use this endpoint to do the following: - Modify proxy configuration and environment variables - Register custom pass-through endpoint handlers pointing to attacker-controlled Python code, achieving remote code execution - Read arbitrary server files by setting UI_LOGO_PATH and fetching via /get_image - Take over other priveleged accounts by overwriting UI_USERNAME and UI_PASSWORD environment variables ### Patches Fixed in v1.83.0. The endpoint now requires `proxy_admin` role. ### Workarounds Restrict API key distribution. There is no configuration-level workaround.
Why This Matters
Publisher reporting describes a concrete security event. BugSkan could not yet bind it to a CVE or affected version, so treat the source details as the current record.
Recommended Action
No confirmed vendor remediation is available in the current evidence. Identify deployments of the affected technology matching the evidenced affected versions: < 1.83.0.
Exposure
Exposure unknown
Apr 08, 2026 05:34
Exposure reason: This incident does not currently match a technology in My Interests.
Exploitation status: UNKNOWN
Affected versions: < 1.83.0
Primary entities:
Timeline
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Incident first seen
Apr 04, 2026 03:29BugSkan first recorded this incident.
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LiteLLM: Privilege escalation via unrestricted proxy configuration endpoint
Apr 04, 2026 03:29OSV.dev · Vulnerability
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LiteLLM: Password hash exposure and pass-the-hash authentication bypass
Apr 08, 2026 05:34OSV.dev · Vulnerability
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Latest observed development
Apr 08, 2026 05:34Most recent source or update associated with this incident.
Sources
OSV.dev · Apr 04, 2026 03:29
### Impact The `/config/update endpoint` does not enforce admin role authorization. A user who is already authenticated into the platform can then use this endpoint to do the following: - Modify proxy configuration and environment variables - Register custom pass-through endpoint handlers pointing to attacker-controlled Python code, achieving remote code execution - Read arbitrary server files by setting UI_LOGO_PATH and fetching via /get_image - Take over other priveleged accounts by overwriting UI_USERNAME and UI_PASSWORD environment variables ### Patches Fixed in v1.83.0. The endpoint now requires `proxy_admin` role. ### Workarounds Restrict API key distribution. There is no configuration-level workaround.
Open publisher sourceOSV.dev · Apr 08, 2026 05:34
### Impact Three issues combine into a full authentication bypass chain: 1. Weak hashing: User passwords are stored as unsalted SHA-256 hashes, making them vulnerable to rainbow table attacks and trivially identifying users with identical passwords. 2. Hash exposure: Multiple API endpoints (/user/info, /user/update, /spend/users) return the password hash field in responses to any authenticated user regardless of role. Plaintext passwords could also potentially be exposed in certain scenarios. 4. Pass-the-hash: The /v2/login endpoint accepts the raw SHA-256 hash as a valid password without re-hashing, allowing direct login with a stolen An already authenticated user can retrieve another user's password hash from the API and use it to log in as that user. This enables full privilege escalation in three HTTP requests. ### Patches Fixed in v1.83.0. Passwords are now hashed with scrypt (random 16-byte salt, n=16384, r=8, p=1). Password hashes are stripped from all API responses. Existing SHA-256 hashes are transparently migrated on next login.
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