Incidents tagged GitHub

This week, the dangerous stuff keeps arriving dressed as something boring. An update. A login box. A search answer. A coding tool. A link you have clicked a hundred times before. That is the thread running through the pile. Trusted paths get poisoned. Old bugs find new jobs. AI tools leak more than expected. Fake prompts look real enough. And some attacks barely need an exploit at all — just

Cybersecurity researchers have disclosed Go-based malware distributed via two Go Modules and two Terraform providers, marking the first time threat actors are using the centralized repository hosted by HashiCorp as a distribution vector for malicious payloads. According to Aikido, the list of Terraform providers and Go modules is below - gocommunity-io/dockerd (222 downloads) kreuzwenker/

Three-Person Team Uses Claude to Breach OpenAI's Core Codebase; $6,500 Bounty Triggers AI Security Alarm finance.biggo.com

A financially motivated threat actor has been linked to the development and distribution of a JavaScript (JS)-based information stealer known as PhantomRaven via the npm package registry. "The developer likely wrote the malware using a large language model (LLM), an assessment made with high confidence based on verbose comments, placeholder code, and statistical token-analysis patterns,"

Millions of AI agents imperiled by critical vulnerability in open source package Ars Technica

What the Visual Studio Code Vulnerability Reveals About AI Tooling Risk Cybersecurity Insiders

### Impact A Host-header parsing flaw in the LiteLLM proxy could, under specific conditions, allow unauthenticated access to protected management routes. The auth layer derived the effective route from `request.url.path` in `litellm/proxy/auth/auth_utils.py::get_request_route()`, which Starlette reconstructs from the `Host` header. A crafted `Host` could therefore make the auth gate evaluate a different route from the one FastAPI dispatched. **Most deployments are not affected.** The bypass is blocked by any upstream layer that validates or normalizes `Host`, such as: - a CDN or WAF, such as Cloudflare - a reverse proxy with `server_name` allowlists - a host-based load balancer **LiteLLM Cloud customers are not affected.** ### Patches Fixed in **`1.84.0`**. Upgrade to `1.84.0` or later. No configuration change is required. ### Workarounds If upgrading is not immediately possible, place the proxy behind an upstream component that validates or normalizes the `Host` header before forwarding (a CDN/WAF, a reverse proxy with explicit `server_name` allowlists, or a cloud load balancer with host-based routing rules), or otherwise restrict network access to the proxy listener. ### References - Patched release: [`v1.84.0`](https://github.com/BerriAI/litellm/releases/tag/v1.84.0) **Discovery Credit**: Le The Thang (KCSC) and Kim Ngoc Chung (One Mount Group)

This Copilot vulnerability could expose emails, 2FA codes, and other sensitive data Mashable

Researchers scanned over 19,000 open-source MCP server repositories, revealing that AI-generated code is present in at least 20% and is disproportionately linked to exploitable vulnerabilities. Key findings include 4.1% of identified flaws being exploitable, with SQL injection, RCE, and path traversal prevalent, and 42.6% of vulnerable repositories showing signs of AI code generation.

AI agent finds 18-year-old remote code execution flaw in Nginx csoonline.com

Evidence indicates that GitHub is affected by remote code execution. Reported affected versions include < 1.83.11.

Evidence indicates that Claude Code is affected by a security issue. Reported affected versions include 2.1.88. Exploitation evidence is classified as confirmed in the wild.

The RoguePilot vulnerability in GitHub Codespaces leveraged passive prompt injection within GitHub issues to manipulate Copilot. This enabled attackers to silently execute malicious commands and exfiltrate sensitive data, specifically the `GITHUB_TOKEN`, to external servers.

Security researcher Ari Marzouk disclosed "IDEsaster," a collection of over 30 vulnerabilities, with 24 assigned CVEs, affecting various AI-powered Integrated Development Environments (IDEs) like GitHub Copilot and Cursor. These flaws enable attackers to chain prompt injection techniques with legitimate IDE features and auto-approved AI agent tool calls to achieve sensitive data exfiltration and remote code execution (RCE).

Attackers can achieve remote code execution (RCE) on developer machines by leveraging indirect prompt injection against agentic AI developer tools. This is accomplished by introducing untrusted data, such as malicious commands in GitHub issues or hidden payloads in fake Python packages within pull requests, which the AI agent autonomously executes.

A multi-stage supply chain attack, tracked as UNC6395, originated from the compromise of a Salesloft GitHub repository, leading to the theft of a sensitive OAuth token. This token enabled access to a high-privilege AI chatbot application (Drift) and subsequent exfiltration of customer conversation data and contact information from over 700 integrated Salesforce instances.

Hackers exploited a vulnerable workflow in the Nx build system to achieve code injection and GITHUB_TOKEN theft, enabling the publication of malicious package versions. These malicious packages deployed a post-install script that exfiltrated thousands of sensitive credentials and notably weaponized AI assistants like Claude and Gemini for reconnaissance and data exfiltration.

LangChain through 0.1.10 allows ../ directory traversal by an actor who is able to control the final part of the path parameter in a load_chain call. This bypasses the intended behavior of loading configurations only from the hwchase17/langchain-hub GitHub repository. The outcome can be disclosure of an API key for a large language model online service, or remote code execution.